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I.  Introduction
During the last decade,  Latin American countries have accumulated extensive experience in the privatization
of infrastructure services and in the institutional and regulatory reforms essential to foster a suitable
environment for private investment. Chile, for example, has undertaken remarkable reforms and transferred
publicly-owned utilities to the private sector either by selling the assets or through concession agreements.
Because of the reforms, the country has been able to attract private participation to the provision of public
services like energy, transportation, telecommunications, and potable water and sewerage. This has resulted
in significant efficiency improvements as well as increased coverage. 
The sectors involved in the reforms have usually had natural monopoly characteristics which, in turn, has
required direct regulation of the private firms and the use of specific instruments (laws, contracts) to establish
the way in which tariffs, quality, investment, exclusivity, etc., would be determined and evolve over time.
Although the Chilean legal system is specifically designed to limit discretion in the public sector, some degree
of discretion was permitted to allow the regulatory bodies to adjust to unforeseen developments such as changes
in technology or demand.  Also, some ambiguities or unspecified areas in the design of the new sector structure
and the newly created regulatory framework remain.  
Renegotiations and disputes arise frequently when complete long-term contracts cannot be written at the
moment of contracting and in the absence of institutions which can credibly enforce those contracts. The
consequences of these problems are exacerbated when market design is inadequate or regulation is incomplete.
These problems are characteristic of in developing countries, as a result disputes have been a part of the
Chilean privatization experience.  
More than a decade, after the start of the reform process unforeseen events have provided evidence to the
loopholes in the design of the reform. This has called for the use of discretion by regulatory agencies and, in
some cases, has led to renegotiations and disputes beyond the authority of the regulatory agencies, causing the
intervention of public officials.
In this paper we analyze a series of post-privatization disputes and renegotiations that have taken place in Chile
since the late 1080s in the electricity sector.  This sector was chosen because the privatization process was, to
a large extent, completed a decade ago, providing, enough time to properly evaluate renegotiations and disputes.
The paper also assesses how the lessons learned in the reform of electricity were internalized in the design of
the regulatory framework for highway concessions. 
A number of issues which might have a played a crucial role in inducing or inhibiting disputes in the two
sectors are presented and analyzed. This is followed by an examination of renegotiations and disputes between
regulators and firms, among firms (when they are the result of the privatization process), and between
consumers (represented for example by the antitrust commission) and firms currently working in the industry
or potentially interested in participating.  The focus is two fold, encompassing the nature of the dispute as well
as the role different agents play in it (firms, consumers, the government, and other institutions such as the
judiciary system). 
The analysis of disputes covers different aspects. First, the paper presents an analysis of the source of the
dispute or the renegotiating process. Second, it describes the area in which the original setting  is challenged
(e.g., prices and tariffs,  quality of service, performance requirement, investment plan, competition rules).3
Third, it discusses who benefits (and how) from renegotiation. Fourth, the authors try to determine whether the
outcome of the renegotiation can potentially improve efficiency,  enhance competition or induce competitive
outcomes in noncompetitive markets. Finally, the paper looks at how the dispute was settled, in particular, at
the role of Chilean institutions such as the Judiciary System, the Antitrust Commission, and the  regulator, in
providing rules for achieving efficient outcomes. This includes an assessment of how disputes were settled in
terms of whether there was a regulatory ruling or whether the case was taken to court or solved through third
party mediation. 
The second section of the paper briefly describes the electricity sector in Chile. The third section analyzes how
the structure and regulation of the sector might have inhibited or caused disputes. Section four presents eight
cases of disputes in the electricity sector in Chile. Section five describes the role of institutions in the resolution
of conflicts. The sixth section of the paper discusses highway concessions and the extent to which lessons from
the electricity sector have been adopted in these programs. The last section presents the conclusions. 
II.  The Electricity Sector in Chile
Until the 1930s, there was little State intervention in the electricity sector in Chile; service was provided by the
private sector through domestic and foreign investment in public utility companies and independent generation.
The 1930s, however, marked a period of stagnation as a result of the adverse effects of the Great Depression
and increasing political intervention in utility tariffs.  Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (Endesa), a public
corporation,  was created in 1944. From the beginning, Endesa was a vertically integrated firm, comprising
power generation, transmission, and distribution with responsibility for strategic planning in the industry,
expanding the capacity for generation and transmission and meeting the needs of isolated areas. Endesa became
the dominant firm in the industry by the mid-1950s, with access to important and concentrating most of the
country’s generation capacity and transmission lines financial resources.   During the 1950s and 1960s, the
industry’s main problem was the government’s tendency to keep tariff rates too low (for political reasons)
which, in turn, did not provide adequate incentives to investment. In the early 1970s, the government
nationalized Chilectra (the largest distribution company) and took control of the 51 largest electric companies
in the country, virtually nationalizing the entire industry. Between 1970 and 1973, the government entered in
a period of massive economic mismanagement which deteriorated the profitability of the sector and halted
investment. 
The structure of the industry changed markedly after the coup d’etat of 1973. First, the government
relinquished its role as a producer and distributor, and committed itself only to regulation and strategic planning
activities. To that end, two institutions were created in 1978: the Superintendency of Electricity and Fuels
(SEC), a supervisory agency for electric activities and the National Energy Commission (CNE) that replaced
Endesa in its role as strategic planner. Nevertheless,  Endesa retained operational regulatory responsibility until
1982, when CNE’s role was enhanced to include regulatory activities. At the same time, a new legal framework
was enacted that established norms applicable to all the companies in the sector regardless of ownership. This
provided an opportunity for private companies to enter the sector on equal legal ground as state-owned
companies. These norms included regulation of production, transportation, distribution, concessions, easements,
prices, quality and safety conditions of facilities, machinery and instruments, and relations of the companies
with the State and the private sector.1 In 1986 and 1987, the government auctioned three small hydroelectric generators that belonged to Chilgener and two
medium size hydroelectric generators belonging to Endesa. In 1987, distributors Chilectra and Chilquinta and
generator Chilgener were completely privatized. In 1988 and 1989, small distribution subsidiaries of Endesa were
privatized.
2 Popular capitalism consisted in selling a limited quota of shares to public employees, at a price lower than the value
of the shares on the stock exchange.  The purchase of share could be financed with a portion of the employee’s
retirement funds.  Between 1988 and 1990, Endesa and its transmission system was privatized using this same system.
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Separation of the different productive stages was started in 1981 in preparation for privatization.  Divestiture
of Chilectra resulted in the creation of one generation company (Chilgener) and two distribution companies
(Chilquinta in Valparaiso and Chilectra in Santiago). Endesa was broken into five independent distribution
companies, three generating complexes (Endesa, Pullinque and Pilmaiquén), and three independent integrated
systems Edelnor (in the north) and Edelaysen and Edelmag (in the extreme south).
Privatization was carried out according to the notion that electric generation was a potentially competitive
market, while distribution and transmission were considered local and natural monopolies and, therefore,
needed to be regulated. Four privatization mechanisms were used: (a) sale of small distribution and generation
subsidiaries of Endesa through public bidding (Saesa and Frontel); (b) privatization of large scale distribution
and generation companies by auctioning blocks of shares on the stock exchange;
1 (c)  sale of shares to the
public in small quantities (a mechanism called "popular capitalism");
2 and (d) ownership in two distributors
(Chilectra and Chilquinta) was divested through the repayment in shares of the reimbursable financial
contribution clients make in order to access the network (start-up investment).
The electricity sector in Chile is currently made up of two large independent private systems (SIC and SING)
and two small isolated state-owned systems. SIC, with an installed capacity of 5,300MW, serves most of the
country’s central and southern regions where commercial, industrial and residential consumption are
concentrated.  SING, with an installed capacity of 1,300MW, serves the north where most mining activities
are concentrated. The two publicly-owned systems are Edelaysen (23MW) and Edelmag (48MW) which serve
the southernmost part of the country.
Regulation is designed to support a specific market structure that assumes that some segments of the market
(generation and large consumers) can operate competitively and others (distribution and transmission) cannot.
This implies that standard antitrust legislation could deal with potential noncompetitive behavior in generation
and direct sales to large consumers but that supervision and regulation is needed for distribution and
transmission activities.
Currently, five institutions govern the activities in the electric industry (excluding the Judiciary System):
C The Antitrust Commission is devoted to preventing noncompetitive behavior in all markets, including the
electric sector. The commission has an investigative branch (the Prosecutor's Office) and two independent
commissions. The Preventive Commission is a regional, first-instance judiciary body allowed to punish
noncompetitive practices. The national Resolutive Commission is a second-instance court, also allowed
to punish wrongdoing. The Supreme Court is the only instance of appeal for sanctions applied by the
Antitrust Commissions.3 Specific tasks performed by CDEC are to inform electric companies of current demand and supply conditions;
calculate the spot marginal costs; coordinate major preventive maintenance of the generation facilities; verify
compliance with operating and preventive maintenance programs; determine and value transfers of electricity among
members of the CDEC; and coordinate the operation of transmission systems
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C The Ministry of the Economy has the right to set tariffs (as proposed by the CNE) and promote the
efficient development of the generation, transmission and distribution subsectors. 
C The Superintendency of Electricity and Fuels (SEC) is an independent supervisory agency (related to the
Ministry of the Economy) in charge of monitoring compliance with the law and regulations.  It also
controls the quality of service and safety of facilities, processes applications for concessions and prepares
the information required to set tariff rates.
C The National Energy Commission (CNE) is an advisory government agency on all matters related to
energy (including, electricity, fuels, nuclear power, etc.). Its duties include establishing sector policies and
development strategies, studying and proposing economic and technical norms, and calculating tariffs and
prices. The CNE is made up of an Executive Council and an Executive Secretariat. The Council is presided
over by a representative of the President of the Republic and composed of a committee of six ministers.
The Executive Secretariat is in charge of the administration of the Commission, and the Council delegates
compliance with all the tasks for which the agency is responsible to the Secretariat. Most of the proposals
for the restructuring of the electric sector have been prepared by the CNE.
C The Economic Load Dispatching Center (CDEC) is a coordination entity designed to optimize the
operation of the generation system. In the short run, the CDEC acts as a clearinghouse in the energy
market, while in the long run it is in charge of planning the operation of the combined generation-
transmission system. Its main objectives are to preserve the security of service; to guarantee the most
efficient operation of the electric system's facilities as a whole, and to ensure the right of way on
transmission systems, as established by concessioning agreements.
3  There are limitations to participation
in the CDEC directory, though all of them can use the system. Only companies with a minimum generating
capacity of 60 MW are allowed to participate in the Board of Directors. Its one-year presidency term
rotates among its members and decisions are binding. Divergences (disagreements among members) are
resolved by the Ministry of the Economy within 120 days of issue.
Consumers whose a demand for power, is less than 2MW face regulated prices, as it is deemed that their
negotiating capacity is limited with regards to the distribution company which operates as a monopoly in its
concession area. The regulated price is determined by the regulator as a combination of the node price
(described below) and a regulated margin, which corresponds to the imputed value added of distribution.
Consumers demanding more than 2MW in power are free to negotiate prices, power and energy directly with
generators or distribution companies. Market conditions, and in particular long-term contracts, determine the
price. It is also noteworthy that the regulatory design of the market assigns a prominent role to this “free
market” final consumer segment. If the free market operates as expected, the free market price provides an easy
and nondisputable reference with which regulated prices can be determined. In fact, the law establishes that
in the setting the node price, calculations made by the regulators must be compared with free market prices and
if the calculated node price is above or below a range of 10percent it should be adjusted to coincide with the
limits of the range.6
Distributors the node price to generators, unless they have signed a contract specifying otherwise. Node prices
correspond to the sum of the basic energy and power cost and a penalty factor. The basic energy cost is
calculated by weighing medium-term marginal costs at a specific point in the network forecast for the next four
years of SIC operation. Costs are obtained using an optimization model that incorporates water supply
restrictions and a projection of demand for the next 10 years. The basic price of power is calculated considering
a gas-fueled plant, according to a formula that includes the cost of investment in diesel turbines; the cost of
investment in transmission lines; fixed operating and maintenance costs; capital recovery factors; a theoretical
power reserve margin of the electric system; and losses on the transmission line. Penalty factors, on the other
hand, correspond to marginal losses of transmission in the system, and they are determined by considering the
distances from every node to the network, as well as the level of tension of the conductors.
Current electricity law defines only the conceptual aspects of determining basic energy costs.  In practice, the
CDEC estimates short-term marginal costs on the basis of the marginal production of power and energy to
supply in the most important loading center of the system (Santiago). In turn, this implies that producers
located in different points in the system should bear all the costs of transportation required to reach the
consumption center.
Chilean law assumes that high-voltage transmission is a natural monopoly and posits that tariffs should equal
marginal costs, while long-term financing gaps should be covered through tolls charged to users. As a results
the law guarantee the right of passage (easement) for all generators as a way to allow competition on an equal
footing between generators. The transmission firm cannot refuse the use of the lines even if the tariff has not
been agreed to in advance. Transmission firms earn income from two sources: the generating companies, which
pay a toll fee for the use of the system, and penalty factors. Toll fees, which are a two-part tariff, were
established by law as a form of "protection" provided to the transmission company so it will not incur losses,
since its average operating costs are higher than its marginal costs. 
III. Potential Sources of Conflict in the Electricity Sector
This section analyzes  how the structure and regulation of the electricity sector might have inhibited or led to
disputes. Renegotiation and conflict arise for a large number of reasons, all of which are present with varying
intensity in Chile. In some cases, open conflict in the form of arbitration or lawsuits have already occurred,
while in others the analysis suggests that renegotiation will likely take place in the future. The most significant
cases of open conflict are discussed in detail in the next section of this paper.
MARKET STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP
Chile’s geography poses peculiar challenges to the industry and suggests areas of potential conflict. The Andes
Mountains favor hydroelectric power generation in the south where dams are relatively easy to build and rain
is abundant. However, in the desert north, thermoelectric generation is the only viable alternative. In addition,
while thermoelectric supply is a determining factor, hydroelectric supply is random as a result of hydrological
risks. Since thermoelectric and hydroelectric generating companies compete under very different operating cost
conditions, profitability depends heavily on strategic actions that give rise to several areas of potential conflict.
In particular, conflict may arise with regard to the management of water reserves by hydroelectric companies,
the allocation of technical risk among firms, the calculation of marginal and operating costs, the order in which
each firm’s supply is dispatched to consumers, and the terms and structure of contracts among firms. These4 Although this is true for most of the country, lines are being built in the north to supply the independent SING
(Greater North Integrated System).
5 Preferential shares were created to increase incentives for efficient management. Transaction prices for these shares
have been considered by critics of privatization as being too low since book values were used (as opposed to market
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issues usually arise from the existence of information asymmetries as discussed in detail in two examples of
open conflict described in the next chapter.
The Andes Mountains also make importing lower-priced electricity from Argentina economically nonviable,
since the cost of building transmission lines and transportation losses are extremely high.
4 However, the same
is not true of natural gas for which there are alternative uses (heating, cooking and industrial). The development
of Chile’s natural gas industry, while still in its infancy, has contributed to changing the structure of the
country’s electric industry. Natural gas affects both thermal and hydroelectric generating companies. Yet, the
investment cost of natural gas-based plants is much lower than that of hydroelectric facilities. This explains
why when the government announced that it would grant concessions for the construction and operation of gas
pipelines, both thermal and hydroelectric companies rushed to position themselves in this new market.
As expected, conflicts and intense lobbying arose with regards to the location of gas pipelines, the auctioning
of long-term contracts, and the regulation of the new market. As discussed in detail further below, this led the
government to take a strong position on the subject, signaling that it dislikes the idea of integration among
energy markets and that it would monitor very closely any contract along those lines. 
The main criticisms to the reform process in Chile arises from the structure of ownership that emerged from
privatization, which is characterized by an important degree of vertical integration. Although the state
monopoly was broken up prior to divestiture, the Law allowed Endesa to be maintain a dominant position when
privatized. It currently produces almost 60 percent of power generation (see Table 1). Lack of due restrictions
to ownership across segments of the industry, in addition, permitted Endesa to keep its virtual monopoly in
high-voltage transmission, despite the generally accepted opinion that a unique high-voltage transmission line
was the only economically viable structure in a country as narrow as Chile. In fact, the reform of the electricity
sector was based on the notion that there is a “natural” monopoly in transmission, but it presumed that it could
be duly regulated. In addition, as a result of the privatization of distribution companies, Enersis, which controls
Endesa, holds 74 percent of the shares in the main distribution company, Chilectra.
This vertically integrated structure has been the source of a large number of disputes and conflicts. Democratic
administrations have claimed repeatedly that Endesa’s dominant role in generation and transmission does not
allow for fair competition in the sector. A large-scale lawsuit (described in detail in chapter 4) was initiated
in 1990 when the Fiscal Económico (National Economic Prosecutor) complained to the Antitrust Commission
charging that Chilectra, Endesa and Transelec engaged in noncompetitive behavior (discriminating against the
small producer, Pullinque). The accusation was rejected as was an appeal to the Supreme Court. Theprosecutor
initiated a second procedure against Enersis immediately after the first trial ended. The second trial lasted until
June, 1997 and again favored Enersis.
A second line of criticism arises from the fact that divestiture led to the creation of several classes of shares
with different decision-making power. For example, few preferential shares allow control of Endesa and its
affiliates. During most of the 1990s, Enersis controlled Endesa with only 25 percent of the shares.
5 values). A correlated problem is that privatization did not consider clear procedures and a thorough revision of the
financial stance of bidders, thus allowing practices that do not lend themselves to the required transparency of the
process (for a detailed description, see Sáez, 1993).
8
Table 1
Participation of Firms in the Main Integrated Systems in 1998 (percent)
Generation Transmission Lines Distribution
Firms SIC SING SIC SING SIC SING
Endesa (controlled by Enersis) 54.8 4.7 12.3 3.6 - -
Gener Group 26.3 17.5 7.7 8.0 - -
Colbún 14.7 - - - - -
Tocopilla - 40.2 - 31.6 - -
Edelnor - 26.3 - 28.9 - -
Other Generators 4.2 11.3 0.5 - - -
Transelec (owned by Endesa) - - 69.5 - - -
Transnet - - 6.5 - - -
Private Transmission Lines (mining
co.)
- - - 27.9 - -
Chilectra (controlled by Enersis) - - - - 37.0 -
Chilquinta - - - - 11.1 -
CGE - - - - 16.8 -
Other private distribution companies - - - - 35.1 -
State Companies - - - - - 100.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: National Energy Commission (CNE).
A third line of criticism arises from the “first-move advantage” that Endesa holds, because as the former sole
agency responsible for investment plans it had access to privileged information on new commercial areas, water
rights, reserves management, etc. In this case, the private managers of the company were privy to information
that could have been used to discriminate or block entry of potential competitors.
After privatization, it is clear that the government could have imposed tighter ownership controls to prevent
Enersis from holding interests in distribution, transmission and generation simultaneously. Ownership,
however, is not the main issue when regulation is correctly enacted and informational asymmetries are not
significant. This is, unfortunately, not the case in Chile.9
REGULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Regulation in the electric sector is usually complex both from a technical and an economic point of view. The
process is further complicated in Chile where some important aspects of the regulatory framework have not
been specified in sufficient detail. Both elements suggest the existence of several areas which are potential
sources of contract renegotiation and disputes.
Energy Dispatch
Since only companies with a minimum generating capacity of 60 MW are allowed to participate in the Board
of Directors of CDEC, and given the concentration of property in generation, Endesa and its affiliates have
been able to control this institution. Due to the largely technical nature of its mandate, conflict was practically
absent until the 1998-99 drought when the coordinating role of the CDEC proved vulnerable to property
concentration.
Distribution
Prices for distribution are reviewed every four years. As such, this constitutes a pre-announced negotiation,
in which strategic behavior is likely. Operators have suggested, for example, that the government had engaged
in lawsuits at precisely the time that tariffs were to be revised in an attempt to curtail the bargaining power of
large players in the industry. The regulator, on the other hand, has claimed that distributors engage in lobbying
through private sector entities during tariff revisions.
The mechanism requires the government and firms in the industry to agree on a range of inflation-adjusted
prices to be charged to consumers for a prespecified number of years. Prices are established such that an
efficient firm obtains a targeted rate of return on assets. Since such firm does not exist, a simulation model is
used as a benchmark. In principle and under symmetric information, the mechanism should provide adequate
incentives to firms to reduce costs by forcing them to compete against the simulated optimal firm (this could
be considered a form of yardstick competition).  Under asymmetric information, however, this mechanism has
important shortcomings. One unsolved problem is how the regulator obtains the cost structure of the efficient
firm. Experience shows that when information is based on actual market data costs are strongly influenced by
those of the existing monopoly so that, in practice, the mechanism tends to converge to the standard rate of
return model. 
Furthermore, the way in which tariffs are set could also distort prices. Both the regulator and the monopoly
make their own costs estimates.  If discrepancies remain after negotiation, the final estimated cost of the
efficient firm is the weighted average of the estimates provided by the firm and the regulator. In this case,
opportunistic behavior clearly arises during renegotiation.
Node Prices
The current electric law defines only the conceptual aspects of determining basic energy costs. In practice,
CDEC estimates short-term marginal costs on the basis of the marginal production of energy to supply the most
important loading center of the system (Santiago). In turn, this implies that producers located at different points
in the system should bear all the costs of transportation required to reach the consumption center.6 For example, the 1997 season was extremely rainy. As a result, there were cases of dam overflow that forced
companies to allow the spillover. Since the spillover is a loss of money, the order of a firms’ electricity supply mattered
substantially. Firms dispatched last were forced to waste more water than firms dispatched early. Since the majority
of the members of the CDEC Board of Directors are from Endesa, it is possible that it could have used its dominant
role to its benefit.
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The determination of node prices allows for several areas in which disputes could arise. First, prices are
determined on the basis of forecasts of water availability and safety margin. Since Endesa holds most water
rights and manages water reserves, small hydroelectric producers have claimed it has an informational
advantage which hampers competition in generation.  Safety margins and other technical issues, on the other
hand, are increasingly being disputed by operators (in particular, thermoelectric firms) as being too beneficial
for hydroelectric companies, such as Endesa.
6  Although these disputes do not necessarily reflect the workings
of the industry, they point to the potential damaging role that information asymmetry could play in the sector.
A side issue, but a crucial one, affecting the work of the industry is that distributors have the “legal right” to
buy at node prices to serve the regulated market. It is clear that economic quasi-rents could be obtained by a
distributor since it can allocate purchases at will. Since short-run marginal costs differ between thermoelectric
and hydroelectric producers during the year (because of changing levels of water reserves and weather
conditions), a distributor could potentially benefit a particular company by signing contracts for only part of
the year. In the long run, this will produce high profits and low profits generators, and could eventually drive
the latter out of the market.
Transmission Tolls
Chilean regulation guarantees open access to transmission lines.  This means that, as long as it has excess
capacity, a transmission company cannot refuse to serve any producer interested in dispatching energy to a
consumer or to be sold in the spot market. Regulation, however, is incomplete in two important areas: new
investments required to expand the network and transmission tolls.
Legislation enacted in 1982 (Electric Law) did not establish clear procedures for setting transmission charges.
The legal framework was modified in 1990 to establish the price system for the transmission sector. Although
the law was passed and it covered the basic lines along which prices are to be set, its corresponding statute
(which determines prices in practice) was drafted only in 1998 and is not operative to date. This has been one
of the main sources of disputes among private firms. 
When capacity is limited or new transmission lines are necessary, the law presumes that interested firms and
the transmission company can negotiate an agreement to undertake the required investments. To a large extent,
the law does not consider the possible asymmetric bargaining power of firms, in particular, when the additional
demand is not substantial. Large mining operations have been able to deal efficiently with this problem through
public auctions of their demand for energy. In these cases, the negotiation involves generation and transmission
companies. As is usually the case, when a satisfactory offer is not possible, the generating company offers to
build its own (dedicated) transmission line. This option, however, is limited to customers with a large demand.11
IV. Cases of Open Conflict and Renegotiations
In this section, we present eight cases of open conflict, which either went through the Judiciary System
(Antitrust Commissions, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court) or through private arbitration
processes. These are not only the most representative cases but also cover most of disputes through 1999.
Although most of these cases have to do with market structure, regulation and enforcing ability, it is necessary
to bear in mind that each of them is, to some extent, unique. Accordingly, they are grouped in cases of conflict
arising from inadequate market structure and regulatory failure. 
MARKET STRUCTURE ISSUES
Case 1.  Vertical Integration Disputes
This case highlights the fact that a vertically integrated monopoly (Endesa which accounts for 55 percent of
the generation market and Transelec, the only high-voltage transmitter may hamper competition, even if open
access to transmission lines is guaranteed by law. Two major trials were initiated, and subsequently lost by the
Fiscal Económico, in order to divest vertical integration between Endesa and Transelec. 
The first trial (1990-1992) followed a complaint the Antitrust Commission by the small producer Pullinque
against Enersis for noncompetitive behavior due to vertical integration. The prosecutor started the process,
conducted the investigation and based the claim on three elements: a) that participation of Enersis in generation
(Endesa), transmission (Endesa) and distribution (Chilectra) hampered competition; b) a set of allegations by
Pullinque of wrongdoing by Endesa; and c) the fact that a representative of Enersis was elected CEO of
Endesa.
The Resolution Committee of the Antitrust Commission voted in favor of Enersis. An appeal to the Supreme
Court was also favorable to Enersis, although  by a split decision. The Supreme Court declared that no
evidence of abuse of power or misconduct accompanied the prosecutor's claim and that imposing sanctions
would amount to limiting Enersis' constitutional rights. The only part of the claim with which the Supreme
Court agreed was the third element, election of an Enersis director as CEO of Endesa, which could negatively
affect the transparency necessary for the competitive functioning of this sector. Consequently, the court’s
decision required that "the authorities ... in due time ought to adopt the necessary measures to ensure and
reestablish transparency in the electricity market."  To date, no measure has been enacted.
Investigations to support a second claim of vertical integration were initiated in 1992, immediately after the
first trial denied the prosecutor's claim.  The Fiscal Económico sued Endesa and Transelec on the grounds that
vertical integration could potentially hamper economic efficiency ("risk" of noncompetitive behavior). The
prosecutor's goal was to divest the vertically integrated consortium of Endesa and its transmission subsidiary
Transelec.  The original claim did not name Enersis as a defendant, focusing only on Endesa, Transelec and
Chilectra to avoid dismissal of the suit on the basis of double jeopardy. However, Enersis became part of the
proceedings when it took control of Endesa in 1994.
The accusation considered the following five elements:12
C Market imperfections characterize the electricity sector and vertical integration creates entry barriers to
generation.
C When electricity distribution and generation are integrated, a central feature of effective competition is
destroyed, i.e., the independence of both activities.
C Although regulation can set appropriate transfer prices, discriminatory practices cannot be ruled out. This
is exacerbated when distribution is highly concentrated because it creates monopsony power in a vertical
integration context.
C Monopoly characteristics in transmission makes its independence from generation necessary.
C In activities with market imperfections, vertical integration must be avoided to maintain competition in
other markets.
The defense based its arguments on two considerations:
C The matter had already been taken up by the Court and renewed action constituted double jeopardy. The
only difference between 1990 and 1994 was an increase in the ownership of Endesa by Enersis within the
limits of concentration regulation, which per se is not illegal.
C The Fiscal Económico's perceived "additional risk" of noncompetitive behavior had no legal or economic
basis, since there was no evidence of wrongdoing.
Although the judges verdict in favor of Enersis in the second trial was unanimous, rumors abounded that
opinions among the judges were heavily divided.  The prosecutor characterized the verdict as "abusive," but
refrained from pursuing the issue to the Supreme Court.  In addition to the June 1997 verdict, the Antitrust
Commission issued a set of "recommendations" for improving performance of the electricity sector.
Recommendations are considered mandatory in spirit, that is, the issues raised should be addressed but they
do not necessarily need to be solved by the authorities in the way proposed by the Antitrust Commission :
C The pertinent authorities must issue a statute for the sector (which had been pending since 1990), as soon
as possible. To resolve existing ambiguities regarding the use of transmission lines and establishment of
toll charges, the authorities must promote the enactment of all necessary changes to existing legislation.
C Because of the existence of information asymmetries, Transelec must become the owner of the assets it
now manages. This should be undertaken in a manner determined by Transelec shareholders but within a
relatively near time horizon.
C Given the lack of adequate procedures to ensure the expansion of the transmission network when that
becomes necessary, Transelec should open itself up to participation by other interested firms, whether or
not they are involved in generation.
C In order to increase transparency, distribution companies should purchase energy and power by means of
a public auction. The rules and regulations governing the auctions should be established freely by the
distribution companies. These should apply generally to all and be nondiscriminatory, and public
information should be readily available (contrary to current practice). The latter is necessary in order to13
eliminate any possibility of arbitrary or illicit discrimination, and to transfer any potential cost reduction
to users.
The analysis of the trial shows several issues: First, the prosecutor had a very weak case. In fact, the claim was
presented in terms of "fears that Chilectra would grant preferential contracts to other Enersis firms" and "fears
that there could be conflicts of interest within the CDEC as a result of the fact that the firms were part of the
Enersis holding company." The prosecution did not explain how these practices could be implemented or what
types of behavior would be consistent with these fears. Second, the prosecution relied on legal arguments,
disregarding economic facts, and failed to convince the judges of the need to consider the conditions which
could allow for noncompetitive behavior instead of looking for documented proof of such behavior (as required
by the Supreme Court in its 1992 decision). Third, potential beneficiaries of Enersis' divestiture were
surprisingly  absent from the process.
Case 2.  Discrimination against a Generator 
This case illustrates how the existence of a vertically integrated conglomerate may discriminate and predate
a potentially competitive segment of the industry. 
In 1992, Colbún sued Chilectra, Endesa and Pehuenche for discrimination and predatory practices. The suit
started as a technical divergence in the CDEC with the Minister of the Economy acting as judge in the case.
When the Minister decided in favor of Colbún, Enersis took the case to the Antitrust Commission on the
grounds that the Minister of the Economy was not competent to decide in the matter. During 1992, the
Resolution Commission studied the dispute without reaching a decision. In September, 1992 the parties settled
the dispute. Enersis signed an agreement to compensate Colbún for losses and accepted to modify its contracts.
Chilectra and Colbún signed a long-term contract (1992-2001) with characteristics similar to those signed by
other suppliers (Endesa and Gener).
The sources of the conflict were a 1989 agreement signed by all members of CDEC regarding prorating sales
to distributors, a poorly designed contract between Chilectra and Colbún, and the disturbing role played by the
arrival of new producers into the generation market. According to this agreement, at each point in time
Chilectra had to buy energy at node prices from Endesa and Gener in an amount proportional to the annual
supply of energy contracted by Chilectra with each of them. This clause was imposed by CDEC to avoid
noncompetitive practices by Chilectra in favor of other members of the vertically integrated firm, Enersis. On
the other hand, Colbún had signed a contract to become Chilectra’s residual supplier in the market; that is,
when its other suppliers (Endesa and Gener) could not meet demand.
In 1991, Pehuenche (an Endesa subsidiary) started operations and began to sell energy to Chilectra without
complying with the 1989 agreement. Enersis interpreted the 1989 agreement as binding only for CDED
members at the time (that is, Endesa, Gener and Colbún) but not for new members, such as Pehuenche.
Accordingly, a contract was signed allowing Pehuenche to sell variable quantities of energy to Chilectra, i.e.,
without respecting the proportionality limits. In fact, at times Pehuenche was dispatched at almost 80 percent
of its capacity to Chilectra while on other occasions it was not dispatched at all.
Colbún claimed that noncompliance with the 1989 agreement by Pehuenche was detrimental to its interests
because, as a residual supplier, Colbún was required to provide vast amounts of energy only when marginal
costs were above node prices, and very little during the rest of the year. This situation left Pehuenche better
off (selling at node prices above marginal costs) to the detriment of Colbún (selling below marginal costs),14
while Endesa and Chilectra were unaffected. As mentioned by Blanlot (1993), the long-run condition that
marginal costs should equate node prices (which is at the basis of the price mechanisms) was not met. 
Colbún based its allegations on the fact that market discrimination was raising its long-run marginal costs.
According to Colbún this was evidence of predatory behavior on the part of Enersis.  The following elements
contributed to this dispute: 
C The contract signed by Colbún and Chilectra was clearly incomplete and disadvantageous to Colbún,
particularly when compared to those signed by Endesa and Gener with Chilectra. The fact that Colbún was
Chilectra's residual supplier was not a problem under  the 1989 agreement, but an unforeseen contingency
made it detrimental to Colbún. Colbún's strategy was clearly short-sighted given that Pehuenche's facilities
were under construction and it could be fully anticipated that it was going to become a major supplier.
C The  relationship of Chilectra, Endesa and Pehuenche as members of the same holding company facilitates
coordination for discrimination.
C With Chilectra's approval, Endesa gave Pehuenche the right to sell to Chilectra 190MW out of almost
500MW of energy contracted between Endesa and Chilectra at that time. Chilectra and Pehuenche made
a private contract with a flexible supply of energy. Pehuenche can thus use this strategy to profit during
periods of melting snow, to the detriment of Colbún. In fact, between April and June 1991, when marginal
costs were above node prices, Pehuenche did not sell any energy to Chilectra, so that Colbún had to supply
Chilectra at a loss. During the second semester of 1991, when the marginal cost was below node prices,
Pehuenche supplied large amounts of energy to Chilectra forcing Colbún sales to drop to zero.
Several authors favored Colbún's position (e.g., Bitran and Saavedra, 1993; Blanlot, 1993; and Morandé and
Sánchez, 1992) and remarked that the crucial factors facilitating discriminatory practices were the existence
of a conglomerate in the industry and an ambiguous regulatory framework in the electricity sector in Chile.
Although Chilectra buys energy at node prices and in this regard it did not favor Enersis affiliates, cost
arbitration made discrimination profitable for Enersis. Pehuenche's profits from its sales to Chilectra were
larger than Endesa's reduction in profits (due to its voluntary reduction in sales). Enersis' control over Chilectra
was also necessary for discrimination to occur because Chilectra stockholders were indifferent between
accepting or not Endesa's decision. Clearly, the discriminatory strategy was profitable only to those Chilectra's
stockholders belonging to Enersis.
Case 3.   Exclusivity of Concession Areas 
This case highlights the possibility of competition between two.
Distributors in Chile have been granted concession areas which are, most of the time, exclusive and based on
historical (pre-privatization) precedents. In fact, concessions are granted immediately upon request, except
when the regulator considers it technically unfeasible. Areas of concession can be urban or suburban, facing
different legal and regulatory treatment (e.g., they face different regulated prices). The regulators can grant
concessions without limitations but have traditionally expressed doubts about allowing overlapping distribution
networks given the economic cost of duplicating facilities. In fact, the head of CNE (Energy National
Commission) declared in 1996 that "concentration of distribution activities is determined by technical, not
economic, factors" and that two distribution networks would be inefficient.15
Since its inception, concession areas in electricity have never been questioned. They have become, in fact, the
private property of the firms. Conflict, nevertheless, arose in Santiago when a large distribution firm (Chilectra)
was accused of predatory practices by a rival (Sinel) in an area where concessions de facto overlapped.
Chilectra, the main distributor in the Santiago area, usually covers the urban sector. Sinel, on the other hand,
is a small rural distributor. The electricity law states that tariff rates must be set for customers, not for
geographical areas. Hence, when Chilectra began to sell in Sinel's territory, the latter feared that it could be
eliminated from the market if cross-subsidies from urban to semi-urban consumers were allowed  (semi-urban
distribution costs are 15 percent higher than urban costs, Paredes et al., 1995). In 1991, Sinel complained to
the Antitrust Commission.
The Prevention Commission of the Antitrust Commission ruled that overlapping should not be allowed. The
decision reversed in the Resolution Commission whose opinion was that concession areas were not exclusive
(thus allowing overlaps) but selling prices to regulated consumers among firms could not differ. Then, in
practice, the higher court favored competition.
REGULATORY FAILURE ISSUES
Case 4.  Lack of Definition of Transmission Tolls
This case illustrates how incomplete regulation (absence of pricing mechanism for transmission tolls), and the
resulting uncertainty can lead to socially inefficient outcomes.
Lack of a proper definition of transmission tolls and cost-sharing in expansion investments have been the most
important areas of conflict and renegotiation in the electric industry in Chile.  As mentioned, the law guarantees
open access to the transmission network as long as capacity allows it. When capacity does not permit an
additional user, investment in the network and its associated costs should be established freely through
negotiations between the user and the owner of the network. The potential user, therefore, has the choice of
connecting with the network of the transmission company (and avoid undertaking the investments) or,
alternately, building the lines to satisfy its own requirements and connecting with the network at the points it
deems most suitable. An intermediate solution would be to build the lines it needs and connect with the network
only for the use of sections that have surplus capacity.  The law also establishes that the company that owns
the facilities should calculate the value of the toll, the areas of influence, the new replacement value (NRV) and
how it should be prorated among firms. Nevertheless, the transmission company should make the replacement
values and operating costs for all the sections of the system available to all members of the SIC. A user who
does not agree with the toll calculated by the company has recourse to arbitration.  
In 1990, Colbún, then a stated-owned firm began supplying energy to Chilectra. From the beginning, Colbún
and Endesa disagreed on transmission tolls and connection fees. By the end of that year, both firms agreed to
call on an Arbitrage Commission to settle matters. However, the Commission was unable to determine what
the transmission costs should be and the proportion that Colbún should pay. Between 1992 and 1997, Colbún
and Endesa-Transelec disagreed on the amount of those tolls, so that Colbún made annual provisions (tentative
payments) for US$12 to US$13 million, until the dispute was solved.
During 1994, disagreement between Transelec and Colbún regarding transmission tolls widened. According
to a study of transmission costs by Transelec, an annual payment of US$21 million was consistent with the
proportion of energy sent by Colbún to Santiago (prorated). Colbún rejected this proposal on the grounds that16
it was arbitrary and monopolistic, and was aimed at increasing pressure on the Arbitrage Commission to
resolve the dispute concerning unpaid transmission fees. Fearing it could lose at the arbitration table and face
further litigation costs, Colbún began studying alternative solutions to its transmission problem; namely,
building its own transmission line to Santiago. The study concluded that the line would cost US$70 million to
build, which represented US$7.5 million a year in terms of Colbún's cost of capital. Taking into consideration
yearly operation costs of US$ 4 million, the cost of owning its own transmission lines would be, at most,
US$11.5 million a year.
Once Colbún decided to build a private transmission line, Enersis (which owned Transelec through Endesa)
followed two different strategies. The first one was to convince Colbún (and the government) that an
independent line was an inefficient solution, not only from a social point of view, but also from a strictly private
perspective. Hence, in June 1995, Transelec offered a transmission fee of only US$10.5 million a year; by the
end of 1995 the fee was reduced to US$10.3 millions a year. The second strategy consisted of starting
conversations with the government in order to reduce or eliminate vertical integration in generation and
transmission markets. Endesa planned to divest Transelec and retain only 30 percent of the shares, while the
rest would be allocated in the stock market to be purchased by pension funds (AFPs) and other generating
companies. Conversations between Enersis and Colbún lasted until January, 1996. Enersis requested that
Colbún build only one 500 KVh line (and use existing Transelec facilities as backup), and later to transfer the
line to Transelec as a capital participation.  Colbún did not agree to this scheme, however, and in January 1996
started to build two 220 KVh transmission lines. According to Colbún's top executives, their decision was
strictly commercial. Despite indications that two transmission firms would be socially inefficient given
important scale economies in this segment of the market, the government did not intervene. 
At first glance, Colbún's decision may appear to be politically motivated in an effort by the government to
curtail Enersis' political and economic power. A closer evaluation of the project, however, shows that this is
not the case. In spite of scale economies in transporting electricity, Colbún's annual costs for using its own lines
are only US$1 million more than under Transelec's final proposal. In addition, building its own line meant that
Colbún would be able to avoid litigation costs. Considering the history of conflicts between Enersis' firms and
Colbún, it does not seem a high price to pay for independence. Moreover, building only one transmission line
and hiring backup service from Transelec, whose fees are not regulated, did not assure Colbún that Transelec
would not use its monopoly power in the future to extract rents. This argument was of strategic importance in
1995 when the government was looking to privatize Colbún. The firm's independence was considered crucial
in finding a majority partner.
Disputes related to this case, however, did not end after Colbún started building its own lines. The first problem
arose as a result of a new Endesa hydroelectric plant, Pangue, which was scheduled to enter into service in
March, 1997. When Transelec requested permission to expand the capacity of its transmission lines to
accommodate Pangue's production, the CNE responded that an expansion was unnecessary because Colbún
withdrawal as a Transelec client meant that, Pangue's needs could be met and delays could be easily avoided.
Colbún's new transmission lines were expected to be in service in June of that year. Since the existing lines
between Alcoa and Alto Jahuel were insufficient to transport Pangue's energy without considerable losses,
Enersis initiated a strong debate in order to obtain compensation from Colbún for delays in the construction
of its lines.  Firms decided to resolve these problems through a mediator who worked successfully beyond the
standard role as arbitrator to devise a technical solution and ease the conflict. Colbún's transmission lines
finally entered into operation in August 1997.17
Case 5. Tariff Setting in the Regulated Distribution Market
This case is shows how legal ambiguities provide scope for opportunistic behavior. 
After the tariff setting process was concluded in November 1996, the National Energy Commission  announced
the new regulated distribution prices (tariffs) in the electricity sector which would be applicable for the next
four years. Tariffs were between 5.8 and 6.4 percent lower than the prevailing values. Immediately after the
announcement, three major companies (two of them, Chilectra and Río Maipo, controlled by Enersis) argued
that the new tariff scheme was arbitrary and appealed to the Court for protection. The third firm involved was
Eléctrica Puente Alto.
The main effect of this appeal (or demand for protection) was to prevent the price change until the Court
determined whether the CNE had the authority to make the price adjustment and proceeded according to
regulations. As a result, until the Court has come to a conclusion distribution companies are able to charge the
prevailing tariffs.
In order to signal their agreement with the fact that electricity distribution was cheaper than it was four years
before, the three distribution companies reduced fixed charges between 26 and 42 percent (Chilectra reduced
charges by 30 percent). These changes were implemented between November 6 and 11. A similar reduction
was implemented by another five minor distribution companies during the first week of December. However,
reductions in fixed charges were negligible when compared with tariff reductions imposed by the CNE.
The regulator realized that distribution companies were able to profit by delaying the tariff reduction announced
by the CNE. This arose from the absence of legislation forcing monopolies to return to consumers any extra
payments when the courts determine the need for tariff reductions. Accordingly, on December 4, the
government enacted legislation to close this loophole. The legislation went into effect on December 28, 1996.
On January 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals accepted the companies’ demand. Immediately, both the regulator
(CNE) and the State Defense Council (which joined the conflict as a consumer representative) appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals and the new regulatory tariffs went into
effect on April 28. Extra payments made in the December 28, 1996 to April 28, 1997 period were later
returned to consumers. Nevertheless, extra income obtained in the November 4 to December 27, 1996 period
was not returned to consumers and distribution companies realized additional profits of around US$7 million
as a result of the lawsuit.
Case 6.  Regulation of Related Industries
This case illustrates how an inadequate design for the natural gas sector  could potentially hamper electricity
market performance.
In July 1990, Chile and Argentina signed an initial agreement to allow the construction of a gas pipeline
between the two countries. In August 1991, a protocol was signed to specify detailed conditions for export,
including a daily limit of 5 million cubic meter. In early 1992, ENAP (the Chilean state-owned monopoly oil
refinery) signed an agreement to buy gas from YPF (its counterpart in Argentina).  In Chile, ENAP entered into
a partnership with Chilectra (allegedly after several other operators in the electricity sector declined to do so).
In March 1993, the Transgas holding company was formed which included Enap, Chilectra and four European
investors (Spain's Enagas and Catalana, and Italy's Snam and Italgas). The project considered bringing the gas18
into Chile by way of a mountain pass located 800 km south of the Santiago main consumption center. The four
European companies left the holding company in October following allegations of corruption in their own
countries. They were replaced by British Gas, Tenneco and Enersis. In Argentina, YPF and other smaller
companies were granted the right to export gas to Chile. The estimated cost of the project is US$1 billion.
In November 1993, a Chilean gas distributor (GASCO) began a study of an alternative pipeline through a
nearby mountain pass (200 km). GASCO invited Enersis main rival, GENER, to become its partner in Gas
Andes. In August 1994, Gas Andes obtained permission from the Argentine government to purchase gas. This
measure was proposed by Argentina's Finance Minister as a mechanism to reduce the power of the recently
privatized oil company, YPF. In June 1995 the governments of Argentina and Chile signed a new protocol
eliminating limits to gas exports, allowing Gas Andes to compete with TransGas.
In mid 1994, TransGas and Gas Andes agreed to naming a arbiter to determine the feasibility merging the two
projects. Disagreements started over the person chosen as arbiter the issue and spread to questions over control
of the joint venture. Since the latter question could not be solved, the proposal was abandoned. At the same
time, the government hired a consulting firm to evaluate the projects and determine the feasibility of each. The
arbiter concluded that the projects were incompatible with each other, while the consulting firm favored Gas
Andes.
As a result of the failure of the joint venture, the companies entered a brief but fierce price war to sign
long-term contracts with clients during May and June 1995 and ensure the economic viability of the projects.
Final offers were as much as 24 percent lower than initial tariffs and the expected reduction in electricity prices
was estimated at 10 percent. In July 1995, GasAndes won the open-season process by offering a tariff that was
one percent below that of TransGas. Even Endesa, a subsidiary of Enersis, contracted to buy gas  from the rival
venture. In August 1995 and after Enersis abandoned the project, TransGas withdrew.
As usual, competition of this sort produces an important amount of lobbying and pressure for special treatment.
Both holdings pressured the CNE through the media (as well as by lobbying politicians and ministers) to gain
to get the concession on exclusivity an exclusive concession grounds and indirectly through politicians and
ministers) to gain. Nevertheless, the CNE assumed a neutral role regarding key issues and, in fact, moved
quickly when changes in market design were necessary. Likewise, the Minister of Finance played a neutral role
despite the fact that he had been the one in charge of evaluating the TransGas project long before becoming
minister.  The CNE, in addition, played an  important role in fostering transparency. First, when the Argentine
authorities announced their interest in redesigning the gas protocol to foster competition, the CNE seized the
opportunity to inhibit Enersis from becoming a "mega-monopoly" in gas and electricity and quickly formed a
team to design the market  and sign a new protocol. Second, the government did not play a crucial role in
determining the outcome of the confrontation by using its power through Colbún (which was state-owned at
the time), letting technical considerations be the major force behind contractual arrangements. Third, the
authorities controlled lobbying within the government by contracting with a private firm to decide which project
was socially preferable maintaining  the discussion within technical limits.
Case 7.  Allocation of Water Rights
This case highlights how the inadequate allocation of water property rights may deter entry in the generation
market.19
Water property rights are an important source of disputes for three reasons. First, watersheds run from east
to west and are not interconnected (thus making arbitration unfeasible). Second, since the country is so narrow
water descends from an altitude of 4,000 meters to sea level in less than one hundred miles; as a result, the
possibilities for locating hydroelectric generating units are limited. Third, the weather tends to be erratic
creating large hydrological risks. Consequently, water rights become crucial for the development of
hydroelectric companies.
Shortly before privatizing the electric sector, the government reformed water rights which were at the time the
sole property of the State. New regulations retained the property in the hands of the State, but established the
right of private parties to request concessions to use water for consumption and other purposes. Rights could
be claimed by any individual or firm at no cost (except in the case of disputes, wherein the government could
auction the rights). In addition, rights do not expire and there is no penalty for holding rights without effective
use. 
Water rights held by Endesa at the time it was privatized were transferred to the new proprietor. These water
rights largely exceed Endesa's investment plan; in fact, Endesa's water rights are such that if generating plants
were built, production could increase by 3,100MW, that is 75 percent of the SIC's current capacity. In addition,
it holds water rights for another 2,000MW in the south which could potentially be linked to the SIC at a
moderate cost. After privatization, Endesa claimed another 79 water rights out of some 280 claims filed by
different electric and industrial companies.
Operators in the market have expressed fears that Endesa could use water rights as an entry deterrence
mechanism. The extent to which these water rights can be effectively used as a barrier to market entry depends,
on the availability of alternative sources for generating electricity. In this sense, imports of natural gas from7 Outage costs (costo de falla, as it is called in the regulation) are transfer prices for energy in cases of system failure.
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Argentina have reduced the value of water rights as a source of monopoly power in generation. Nevertheless,
in 1996 the Antitrust Commission recommended not to give additional water rights to Endesa to avoid
"noncompetitive behavior." This led to the canceling of Endesa's Neltume project, a US$300 million generating
plant that was to have been constructed in 1996-1998.
Moreover, extensive allocation of water rights to Endesa has also had entry deterrence effects in other
industries. In Aysen, a scarcely populated area in the south, Endesa holds 30 percent of available water rights
but does not have facilities in operation, while the local state-owned generating plant supplies the entire current
demand with less than one percent of the area's water rights. This has inhibited the development of an aluminum
plant project which requires a large amount of electricity for its operation. Needing access to water rights, the
Canadian company Noranda invited Endesa to be a (minor) partner in the US$3.000 million project. The
project stalled when Endesa declined the offer.
Case 8.  Regulatory Reaction to an External Shock (the 1998-99 Crisis)
This case illustrates how pitfalls in the regulatory framework and lack of technical know-how in regulatory
institutions can impose high costs on consumers  and create room for further litigation and disputes in the
sector. In addition, it illustrates the damaging role politicians can play when they act to satisfy their
constituencies without regard for superior but "unpopular" technical solutions.
In 1998-99 Chile suffered its worst electricity crisis since the privatization of the industry.  A severe drought
caused marked declines in hydroelectric generation forcing the government to impose rationing. The deficit was
initially estimated at 9 percent of demand but it peaked at 12 percent in April 1999.  Between March and June
rationing affected consumers two hours a day on average; however, plant failures produced blackouts that
lasted as much as six hours (CNE, 1999). The length and depth of the crisis led politicians to blame the private
sector, question the performance of the authorities, and call for a revision of the regulation to tighten
supervision and increase penalties.
The crisis began in early 1998 when the severe effects of a drought led to a significant reduction in
hydroelectric power generation in July and September (see figure 1).
The government refrained from imposing rationing at the last minute as a result of both heavy lobbying by
hydroelectric plant managers and a mistaken technical assessment of the magnitude of the crisis (Rivera, 1999).
Despite the fact that water reserves were at very low levels, the CNE allowed Endesa's hydroelectric power
plants to utilize a substantial amount of water from  the country´s main reservoir, Lake Laja, that was targeted
for agricultural irrigation. It is estimated that, had this water been saved for the dry season, it would have been
enough to avoid rationing (Díaz, et al., 1999). It seems that, at the time, the CNE was confident that it would
either rain or/and that a 350MW combined gas-water cycle power plant under construction would start
producing in November. Unfortunately, it did not rain and the plant was still inoperative in July 1999.
This decision was a major mistake for two reasons. First, it signaled that the authorities were hesitant to impose
rationing and face the political cost of doing so, leaving them vulnerable to lobbying. Second, it created space
for opportunism because prices for the water transfered to Endesa were set at extremely low levels, well below
the system's marginal cost and, of course, outage costs.
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On October 28, despite the fact that the country was suffering the worst drought since 1968, the CNE
announced that power was guaranteed until March 1999 and lowered regulated nodal prices (tariffs) by 10
percent. Tariffs, which are calculated every six months by the CNE, would have been further reduced had not
the free market price limited its reduction (as mentioned, nodal prices cannot be set outside a 10 percent band
around free market prices). By November 11, rationing was imposed.
The 1982 Law stated that when conditions required rationing, consumers should be compensated at outage
costs for unserved energy by the firms unable to fulfill contracts.  Outage costs were estimated by the CNE at
around US$0.146 per kw/h (as a reference, marginal costs in thermoelectric production were around US$0.064
at the time). The need to compensate consumers prompted firms to undertake three types of measures to cope
with the shortage: (a) install emergency equipments (gas-based turbines); (b) purchase existing capacity from
generators with surplus or self-producers with sufficient reserve equipments; and (c) pay a voluntary
compensations to nonregulated consumers to be disconnected. 
The responsibility of firms was, nevertheless, limited. According to the law, compensations were to be paid
only to the equivalent of the 1968-69 drought or if there is a case of force majeure (such as an earthquake).
The rationale for this limitation is that tariffs are calculated using a probabilistic model that excludes droughts
more severe than that of 1968-69 and, hence, consumption is only insured to that extent.
When implementing rationing and emergency measures, the authorities faced considerable opposition from
hydroelectric generators. Three issues were at the heart of disputes. First, hydroelectric firms tried to convince
the authorities that the drought was so severe that it represented a case of force majeure and they should be
exempted from responsibility and compensations. Second, hydroelectric generators claimed that transfer prices
from surplus generators should be valued at marginal costs, instead of outage prices. It should be remembered
that dispatch is made without regard to commercial contracts, so that energy was actually transferred from
surplus to deficit producers but transfer prices had to be settled afterwards. Third, hydroelectric generators
disputed the amount of energy to be compensated and claimed that, according to the law, they were exempted
from responsibility because, had the drought been as severe as that of 1968, they would have had a surplus of
energy. 
The response of the government was slow and. As a result, oportunistic incentives worsened the crisis. Without
the guidance of the authorities, generators did not coordinate properly to reduce the extent of blackouts (e.g.,
periodic maintenance was rescheduled very late) and, at some point, there was excess demand and unused
capacity in the system. It should be acknowledged that the authorities did not have the means to force firms to
cooperate (for example, fines were too low to be effective). In addition, blackouts were initially massive and
unpredictable, instead of being selective and programmed, irritating consumers. Finally, the reluctance of the
government to set outage costs to value energy transfers encouraged firms to speculate that transfer prices were
to be set at marginal costs. In turn, this led producers to continue supplying unregulated clients (worsening the
shortage faced by households) in order to avoid paying disconnection fines that were above marginal costs.
On April 30, six months after rationing was first imposed, but below outage costs, the authorities finally
declared that outage costs were to be used.
The situation quickly went beyond the control of the technical authorities and moved into the political arena.
At the instance of politicians and lobbyists, Congress passed a law determining: (a) that rationing should be
implemented without distinction between regulated and unregulated consumers, and (b) that compensations had22
to be paid in every case (no force majeure) and for the entire amount of the deficit (no exemptions to
compensations). In addition, the new legislation significantly increased fines.  
The first measure destroys the incentives for an economically efficient response to a crisis. Under
administrative rationing, firms will have no opportunity to allocate the available energy among users with
higher valuation and, consequently, shortages will be worsened.  In addition, since rationing is imposed on
regulated clients in the same amount as regulated consumers, the former will face the cost of energy shortages
but not the benefits of the price insurance. In turn, this will hamper the efficient working of the unregulated
segment of the industry. Finally, administrative rationing impedes voluntary reductions in demand by
consumers with low valuation for energy. For example,  most households would be better-off by having its
energy disconnected during the time they are at work and receiving a compensation at outage costs.
The second measure is a change in industry rules that will undoubtedly have long-run effects. Firms will have
a more conservative approach to hedging contracts and, consequently, energy prices will increase as well as
unused capacity. In a country subject to mejor earthquakes, the possibility of energy failures as a result of true
force majeure events cannot be discounted, yet the law makes no exemptions. This creates the basis for future
disputes.
This Law is being disputed by firms at the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Its structure is so poorly
designed that (a) it is inconsistent with current regulation to the extent that the authorities cannot apply it
without violating the Law, and (b) according to some interpretations, it may force firms with a surplus of
energy during system failures to pay compensations.
V. The Role of Chilean Institutions in the Resolution of Conflicts
Although, the five institutions in charge of regulating and monitoring the sector (CNE, CDEC, SEC, the
Antitrust Commission and the Ministry of the Economy) convey a sense of acting in isolation of interest groups
and political parties, their limitations in terms of human capital and resources create  inefficiencies  in
performance, resulting in high litigation costs and a certain randomness  in their  decisions. In this section, we
assess conflicts related to the Antitrust Commission, CDEC and CNE.
THE ANTITRUST COMMISSION
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Commission’s participation in the energy sector. 
During the past eight years, few suits were filed and, except for three large-scale trials, most had little economic
impact. Tables 2 and 3 present a summary of the trials and their corresponding judgements. In total, 16 suits
with significant economic effects were filed at both the Prevention and Resolution Commissions. One episode
led to a large number of disputes: conflicts between Rio Maipo (a small generating company near Santiago)
and Puente Alto (a distributor serving areas close to Santiago) total 25 percent of all cases. In addition, several
disputes are of no consequence to the electricity sector since they involve cases of commercial wrongdoing (e.g.,
accusations of collusion to elect directors). In addition, there were nine other cases (unreported) in which
individuals sued the electric companies for minor issues (such as delays in connection or repair services).23
Table 2
Antitrust Commission:
Proceedings of the Prevention Commission












CHILECTRA abuses its monopoly power
delaying power supply increases required
by SINEL
Overlap of geographic zone allows
predatory practices.
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Rio Maipo abuses monopoly power in the
devolution of payments for an eventual
increment in the power supply






Anticompetitive practices. Puente Alto does
not publicly announce both tariffs and
financial charges 






Rio Maipo abuses monopoly power when
requiring excessive (illegal) guarantees
Guarantees are monopoly





Litoral abuses monopoly power on
installation and power supply
Dismissed
Jul-29-93 Sep-16-93 CORFO 
(asks advice)
CORFO asks whether procedures for
auctioning EDELNOR shares in stock
markets is legal






ENDESA and Gener abuse  monopoly





New water right given to ENDESA may
affect competition in generation
The court recommends that
new water rights should not
be granted until legal
ambiguities are resolved.
Dec-23-96 ENDESA  ENDESA appeals previous sentence
concerning water rights
Vacated
Note: (d) distribution company; (g) generating company; (t) transmission company.24
Table 3
Antitrust Commission:
Proceedings of the Resolution Commission












ENDESA asks VTR to conduct a
study but awards its to a rival firm.
Vacated.
Feb-14-90 Mar-27-90 CHILECTRA
CHILECTRA appeals sentence of
prevention commission
Overlap of geographic
zones is allowed but firms













ENDESA abuses market power.
Excessive tariffs and tolls when using
ENDESA’s transmission facilities 







Firms discriminate against Colbún Withdrawn by Colbún
Sep-26-93 Briones Appeals sentence of resolutive
commission
Vacated.
Mar-22-94 Rio Maipo(g) Rio Maipo appealed sentence of Jan-
27-92
Vacated. Rio Maipo is










National Economic Attorney asks for
divestiture to encourage competition
and eliminate abuse of market power
Rejected in both the
Resolution Commission






abuse of monopoly power.
Vacated.
Jan-07-97 ENDESA ENDESA appeals a previous
sentence by the Prevention
Commission 
Vacated
Note: (d) distribution company; (g) generating company; (t) transmission company.8 Judges in Chile have no formal training in economics.
9 When the Antitrust Commission was formed in the mid-1970s there were 7 to 10 high quality schools of law and
departments of economics in the country, usually with highly trained staff and very independent of political or lobbying
pressures. This makes the “academic” part of the Commission trustworthy. However, later the government deregulated
higher education markets. To date, there are over 70 schools of law and economics, whose quality is very varied.  The
Commission has been very lucky that the last appointees have been, by pure chance, highly trained, but the situation
could certainly change.
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Trials tend to be quite long, on average they lasted 12 months in the Prevention Commission and 20 months
in the Resolution Commission. Since most disputes go through both commissions,  a  dispute may take around
three years to be resolved. Once the Resolution Commission issues a judgement, appeals must go to the
Supreme Court, an endeavor that could last a couple of years more.  As previously described, the Antitrust
Commission has filed two large lawsuits against Enersis on the grounds of abuse of monopoly power. These
were extremely long trials (2 to 4 years) and involved a large number of witnesses and technical reports. Since
the Fiscal Económico is an officer appointed by the President of the Republic, the trial had some touches of
political confrontation but remained largely technical.
To a large extent the inefficiency of the Antitrust Commission results from its lack of resources. Judges work
ad-honorem, which may guarantee independence, but also implies they have little time for these matters which,
in turn, lengthens the processes. The Commission’s technical staff is poorly paid and ill suited for the job
because most are lawyers with little training in economics.
The Resolution Commission (highest ranking) is comprised by five members who are not necessarily trained
to resolve technically complex and economically difficult disputes. The five members are a Supreme Court
judge,
8 two public officers (usually lawyers) appointed ex-officio, and two university deans (one from a law
school, one from an economics school), who are randomly selected from all universities.
9 As is apparent given
its structure, the Commission must rely on expert witnesses to weigh arguments, facts and opinions. But given
its limited financial resources, good advise is not guaranteed. In an effort to help resolve these problems the
government substantially increased the Commission’s budget for 1998.
The legal system in Chile is very antiquated, based largely on tangible proof of illegal activity and not amiable
to acting on the grounds of reasonable presumptions. In fact, illegal practices must be specified in advance
(typified). Moreover, the Commission (a unit bound by public law) is only allowed to do things (instead of
limited to do things, as is the case of the private sector). This limits the range of actions of the Commission,
both in areas of interests and in the type of proofs that are required to punish noncompetitive practices. To
some extent, this legal structure reproduces the spirit of the Chilean legal system which was designed in such
a way such that discretion in the public sector is rare.
An early paper by Paredes (1995) analyzes the decisions made by the Antitrust Commission since its inception
in 1974. He found that although the behavior of the Commission regarding punishment for monopoly practices
seems adequate, the relatively higher prosecution and punishment of vertical integration practices (which are
largely justified in the literature as welfare improving in oligopolistic markets) seems inadequate. The reasons
for this behavior is to be found, according to Paredes, in two elements: the lack of a clear definition of the
purposes of antitrust regulation (which blurs the judgment) and the fact that practices that can be easily
specified mostly correspond to vertical integration.  Also, fines are very low when compared to the potential26
benefits of wrongdoing, eroding the credibility of regulators. Fines levied by the Antitrust Commission between
1975 and 1987 averaged US$29,000, and the maximum fine was US$147,000. For example, on May 1st, 1997
a system failure left  80 percent of the country without electric power for 55 minutes. The largest five
generating companies and Transelec were fined after an investigation proved that their response to the
emergency was excessively slow due to cost considerations (the expected delay is around 3 minutes). The
investigation concluded that the main reason was that “since support units have a higher operating cost than
a failing unit, the CDEC did not respond as fast as expected.” Although maximum fines were levied, they were
minimal in comparison to the average sales or assets of these six companies: each company was fined less than
US$35,000.
Fines were increased substantially during the 1998-99 electricity crisis. It is estimated that they would reach
several million U.S. dollars at their maximum. Certainly, this measure was in the right direction. However, the
new Law also extended the power of the authorities to impose such fines in a very discretionary manner and
located this new faculties in the technically less apt regulatory body, the SEC.
THE DISPATCH CENTER (CDEC)
Disputes in the CDEC have been very limited. An indirect way of assessing the number of disputes in
determining the short-run marginal cost and allocating  demand among different producers is through
discrepancies, i.e., dissent by one or more members of the CDEC from the majority decision. Since CDEC’s
inception, the number of dissensions has remained rather low, as shown in figure 2.
Although the number is very small, the trend is somewhat alarming. It may reflect several aspects of the
evolution of the industry. First, as more operators enter the market (for example, through changes10 Pension funds have come to play an important role in the sector since they were allowed to invest in the stock
market. Foreign investors also participate in the sector.
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inownership)
10 they are challenging Enersis’ dominant role. Second, dissensions have been used as a negotiating
tool in disputes in other areas not necessarily linked to the electric sector. Third, the 1996-1997 hydrological
year was characterized by a severe drought and, for the first time in years, some rationing was considered (it
was not adopted, though voltage was reduced by 5 percent). In these conditions, the CDEC was operating close
to the point of “technical failure,” a condition at which generators could be fined, thus exacerbating disputes.
The case of Gener accusing Endesa of abuse of power in the dispatch of generating plants during the last
months of 1997 exemplifies a conflict within CDEC that went beyond standard procedures. Instead of taking
its complaint to the Minister of the Economy, Gener went directly to the Antitrust Commission. This may
reflect the fact that Gener considered the issue to go beyond the boundaries of a standard CDEC conflict
because the accusation dealt with intentional wrongdoing not a simple technical discrepancy. Alternatively, it
may reflect doubts regarding the ability or diligence of the Minister of the Economy to solve the issue. In any
case, this lawsuit shows clearly that conflict within the CDEC has not only increased in frequency but also in
virulence.
Gener’s allegation was that, invoking security reasons, Endesa had forced the CDEC to allocate less energy
than its capacity would allow to a crucial segment of the northern SIC. In this segment Endesa has no
operations, so that Gener’s subsidiary Guacolda had to supply energy to cover the gap. Since Guacolda is a
thermoelectric producer, at that particular time it would have been to its advantage to purchase energy in the
spot market at marginal cost instead of producing it. Gener estimated the losses in the four months at US$17
million.
The initial response of Endesa was to renounce its role as coordinator of energy dispatch in the CDEC, in
retaliation to the lawsuit. However, the parties reached an out of court settlement and the lawsuit was dropped.
The terms of the agreement are not public but it takes into consideration that Endesa may assume the economic
cost incurred by Guacolda.
THE NATIONAL ENERGY COMMISSION
(CNE)
The CNE, the agency in charge of defining the sector's policies and calculating tariffs and prices, has played
a crucial role in disputes in the electricity sector in Chile. For over seven years, the CNE was unable to issue
the Electricity Sector Statute despite the fact that an advanced draft was ready in 1992. The Statute was
necessary to provide detailed specifications to the general regulatory framework envisioned in the 1982
Electricity Law. Its absence was the source of several disputes (as discussed in section IV).  In particular, the
statute should have specified the methodology to determine transmission tolls and investment charges. When
it was finally enacted in December 1998, however, not only did it lack detailed specification on these issues,
but it actually introduced more ambiguities to the regulation by reinterpreting some of the original provisions
of the Law. Major generating companies have sued the CNE before the Court of Appeals as a result of which
the statute has yet to become operative.
The magnitude of the CNE’s technical and political limitations were clearly evident during the 1998-99
drought. As discussed in section IV, this agency was in charge of determining if it was necessary to impose11 Recently, the government proposed a new breed of franchise in which the total earnings of the concessionaire is
fixed, but the length of the contract varies with demand. The private sector has been reluctant to accept this new
mechanism on the basis of excessive risk.
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rationing, ensure that energy transactions were held at outage costs, and detemine the amount of compensation
that producers had to pay to consumers for unserved energy.  In retrospect, the CNE failed in each of these
areas. First, the authorities were vulnerable to lobbying and political interference and hesitated at the moment
of imposing rationing. Second, the CNE remained undecisive with regards to applying outage costs to value
energy transactions for over six months during the crisis, thus encouraging opportunistic behavior by firms and
deepening the crisis. Third, to date the CNE has been unable to determine the magnitude of compensation, let
alone force firms to pay consumers for unserved energy. Fourth, the CNE was technically incapable of
providing a solution to the crisis and, consequently, had to yield to political pressures and support the poorly
designed law passed by Congress in June 1999 (allowing for generalized  rationing and eliminating exemptions
to compensations).
VI. Applying the Regulatory Experience in the Electricity
  Sector to Highway Franchising
HIGHWAY FRANCHISING IN CHILE
Highway franchising in Chile is a recent phenomenon. Contrary to the case of the electricity sector, highway
concessioning benefit from the rich regulatory experience the Chilean authorities have accumulated since the
privatization program of the late 1980s.  Highway franchising has relied on variations of the “build, operate,
and transfer” (BOT) scheme, in which the State transfers the legal right to invest and operate highways, but
retains ownership of the public works. This right lasts only a limited number of years, a period usually
determined a priori by the government on the basis of the physical duration of the investment.
11 Upon
expiration, the government regains control of the operation and can, in principle, award it again to the private
sector.
The allocation of the concession to the private sector is done through a transparent public auction that proceeds
in two stages. In the first stage, firms interested in participating must qualify to bid on the basis of technical
requirements and financial solvency. In the second stage, the short list of prequalified bidders present their
offers in a single-round, first-price, sealed-bid type of auction. 
A specific contract is designed for each concession based upon the project’s technical requirements and
applicable legislation and regulations. Regulation and auctioning of highway franchises is performed by the
same entity, the Ministry of Public Works (MOP).  Regulation comprises inspection of the construction and
operation of concessions (including quality standards, safety provisions, compliance of the concessionaire with
toll prices and user fees as stipulated in the contract, technical specifications for different aspects of the
highway, etc), penalties for wrongdoing during construction and operation of the highways (to the point of
stopping the work) and allowing minor changes in contract stipulations regarding changes in schedules, new
investments and extensions of the original contract.12 According to the government, expected highway franchising amounts to nearly 80% of total expected concessions
in public infrastructure in this decade. Nevertheless, it only covers around 50% of estimated public roads needs. The
remaining roads correspond to projects with low private profitability and, consequently, will be very likely undertaken
directly by the government (e.g., low-demand inter-urban roads).
13 Since the country is narrow, there are important economies of scale in having a single highway serving as the
backbone of the highway network. In this regard, highway concessions share the same advantages and drawbacks of
the electricity transmission system, described in the previous sections.
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Since the magnitude of investments in highways was deemed by the authorities to be too high for the capacities
of the local financial sector, market design assigned an important role to foreign investment. However, in
addition to the technical complexities of forecasting demand, costs and exchange rate movements, highway
franchising coincided with the transition to democracy adding political uncertainty to the problem. To address
these problems and the fear of having few bidders in initial auctions, the Chilean concessions law provides the
government the ability to offer “guarantees” to concessionaires. For instance, among other things, the
government insured the concessionaire against low demand by guaranteeing a transfer of resources if flows fall
below 75 percent of forecast demand. In addition, the government guarantees the expropriation of land to build
the concession.
Table 4 presents a summary of highways and ongoing investment projects for which concessions have been
awarded. As of November 1998, seven projects were in operation for a total investment of US$620 million.
The government had also auctioned another nine investment projects totaling US$2.5 billions and six other
projects were being studied.
12
In general, the Ministry of Public Works has internalized several lessons learned from the experience of  other
areas of the economy regarding concessions of public works to the private sector. In particular, the experience
in the electricity share, with which public works shares monopoly characteristics, has had a favorable impact
on the institutional and regulatory design.
13  First, authorities have reacted quickly in response to perceived
misconducts or regulation weaknesses. Second, the government has been careful to avoid repeating the mistakes
it made when privatizing the electricity sector, which led to the creation of a very large and politically powerful
holding. Third, the government incorporated mechanisms to reduce contract renegotiations and the cost of
litigation. 
Reaction to Possible Conflicts
The MOP has made an important effort to gain credibility regarding the cases with which it will engage in
renegotiations and disputes. Its tough stance with regards to claims by the concessionaire of El Melón Tunnel
(the first concession awarded) that contract conditions are too detrimental sent a strong signal to the private
sector. According to the concessionaire, its initial demand estimates proved to be too optimistic, so that the
annual transfer it has to make to the government makes the business unprofitable. The government has refused
to change toll prices and transfers beyond the contract stipulations on the grounds that conditions have not
changed, that a bidder in a concession must accept the demand risk, and that renegotiation is costly and
hampers its reputation. In particular, it is difficult for the government to determine whether the firm was low-
balling when it submitted its bid.30
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42 1993 In Operation 3/1996 23 yes minimum flows
Camino de la
Madera
29 1994 In Operation 5/1997 25 yes subsidies and min. flows
Access to
Concepcion
210 1994 In Operation 4/1998 28 no minimum flows
Santiago-San
Antonio




10 1995 In Operation 2/1998 12 no minimum flows
Puchuncavi-
Nogales
12 1995 In Operation 11/1997 22 no minimum flows
Talca-Chillan 172 1995 In Operation 9/1998 10 yes minimum flows
Santiago-
Los Vilos
255 1996 Construction 1999 23 no n.a.
Santiago-
Los Andes
137 1997 Construction 2000 28 yes minimum flows
La Serena-
Los Vilos
245 1996 Construction 2001 25 no subsidies and min. flows
Chillan-
Collipulli
210 1997 Construction 2001 22 no subsidies and min. flows
Temuco-Rio
Bueno




200 1997 Construction 2000 25 no subsidies
Collipulli-
Temuco
226 1998 Construction 2002 25 no subsidies and min. flows
Santiago-
Talca
650 1998 Construction 2002 25 n.a. n.a.
Santiago-
Valparaíso
383 1998 Construction 2002 variable no n.a.
Quintay-
Cartagena
100 e1999 To be
auctioned
-- -- -- --
Camino de la
Fruta




300 e2001 Under study -- -- -- --
Acc. Santiago
North
150 e1999 Under study -- -- -- --
Valparaíso-
Los Andes
200 -- Under study -- -- -- --
Interport
Route
12 e1999 Under study -- -- -- --
 
Source: Authors’ tabulation, based on Ministry of Public Works information.
  Notes: n.a. = not available; e=expected.31
Limiting Concentration 
The aggressive entry of a large foreign company with a bad record of renegotiating highway concessions led
the government to promptly modify regulations in order to limit concessionaires to three of the 12 segments of
Chile’s main highway (the Pan American Highway). It should be recalled that, given Chile’s geography, a
single highway is likely to be the only profitable alternative (as discussed in the case of electricity
transmission).
Although there may have been an underlying political motivation to limiting the size of highway
concessionaires, there are important economic reasons which support it. First, the government correctly gave
priority to setting up a competitive market, rather than just attracting private investment. Considering the
difficulties in regulating the electricity sector, it may be socially desirable to widen the entrepreneurial basis
so as to promote the active participation of the private sector in a competitive environment. The existence of
important sunk costs when bidding for highway concessions (estimated to be approximately US$2 million for
each bid) could lead firms to withdraw if one of the bidders already holds  a large share of the market and the
other firms think the probabilities of winning the auction is thus reduced. 
Second, limiting the number of highway segments to be managed by a single firm provides the government
more information to engage in regulation based on yardstick competition. In principle, operating costs should
not differ markedly among concessionaires and could potentially serve as benchmark for the government if
renegotiation or contract adjustments are required. In addition, collusion among a larger number of
concessionaires becomes increasingly costly, thus reducing a potential source of conflict.
Third, the government is concerned with the potential for political power of a large concessionaire of highways.
Limiting the number of highway segments could reduce this power if firms  can effectively be deterred from
using third parties to disguise their participation. The Chilean Concessions Law includes several mechanisms
to reduce this problem. These provisions arise largely from experience in the electricity sector where
concentration by Enersis has become a major political problem for the government.
Designing Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
The government has made an attempt to overcome the limitations of the Judiciary System by designing and
implementing entities that can, in principle, deal more efficiently with contract renegotiation. Due to design
complexities and uncertainty, contracts in this area are likely to be incomplete and prone to disputes. Taking
into account the limitations of the Judiciary System when dealing with disputes in the electricity sector, the
government created specific entities to deal with contract disputes between concessionaires and the MOP. For
each concession a Conciliation Commission is formed by three members (one for each party to the contract and
an agreed upon third member) which must resolve matters within 30 days of receiving a complaint. Complaints
can be brought by either party, but the government is more limited than the concessionaire regarding the use
of its right. If an agreement is not reached, the private party has two options: either bringing the case before
an Arbitration Commission (whose decisions are binding) or to the Court of Appeals.
This is a novel approach to this problem which inhibits incentives to renegotiate stemming from the weaknesses
of Courts to adjudicate complicated technical problems. However, to a certain extent, the current structure
limits the impact of the Conciliation Commissions.  Although conflict resolution mechanisms are an interesting
component of the Chilean regulatory design, they present some shortcomings. First and foremost, the roles of
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commissions are distorted. In principle, their functioning should be32
diametrically different. The former should concentrate on easing disputes between the concessionaire and the
government, but maintaining a neutral position with regards to both parties. The latter should focus only on
providing solutions to the conflict in the form of legal judgements. 
Consequently, the staff of both commissions should not overlap. A conciliation commission that, at the request
of one party, transforms itself into an arbitration commission induces perverse behavior on both parties. In fact,
the abilities required of members in each commission are markedly different. In the Conciliation Commission
both parties ask mainly for neutrality, in exchange for which they are willing to reveal information to a third
party regarding the extent to which they would yield to reach an agreement. In contrast, an arbitration
commission is efficient if it gains a reputation for its fairness.  Since, under arbitration one party will be
penalized any information divulged is of strategic value.  Hence, parties will not release information to the
Conciliation Commission if they believe that it can be used against them in the event arbitration is called for.
In addition, a practical limitation of  the scheme is that it is difficult to find candidates well suited for both
commissions.
Finally, there are a number of minor issues which show that conciliation and arbitration in this market could
benefit from being redesigned. For example, conciliation and/or arbitration could be called for independently
of the amount of resources involved in the dispute. Likewise, there are no criteria that justify calling  third
parties.  A simple solution to this problem is to separate both commissions and redesign the rules by which they
operate. In particular, the presence of representatives of the parties to the disputes in the Arbitration
Commission does not play any useful role. Indeed, they would probably hamper the efficiency of the
independent member to assess the situation and propose solutions or penalties.
VII.  Conclusions
Chile’s experience with private sector participation in the electricity sector provides ample evidence of the
importance of adequately designing the structure of the post-privatization market, implementing the appropriate
regulatory framework, and developing the institutional capabilities to enforce the regulation. In general terms,
the Chilean case is characterized by a low level of conflict between the authorities and the regulated firms.
However, Chile’s experience shows that incomplete regulation and institutional weakness can become crucial
limitations.
The lack of conflict in this case results from fairly well-conceived design of the post-privatization market,
which includes a clear separation of the different stages of production, sound regulatory principles in each
stage, properly designed conflict resolution mechanisms and no political interference. Notwithstanding some
limitations, regulations ensure monitoring and control, guarantee access to the information necessary to
regulate, and provide for appropriate interaction among private agents and between them and the regulators.
Disputes are concentrated in those areas in which regulation is incomplete, mostly where information
asymmetry is high and regulatory institutions are less able to monitor private sector activities. The cases
reviewed in this report suggest that conflict has stemmed from three main sources: (a) the existence of vertical
integration, (b) the lack of definition of certain areas in regulation (e.g., shortcomings in the procedures to set
transmission tolls and investment cost-sharing); and (c) the institutional weaknesses of regulatory bodies.  One
of the main problems resulting from Chile’s privatization of the electricity sector is that it allowed the creation
of a large vertically-integrated conglomerate (Enersis) that can use its market power in the regulated segment33
of the market to reduce competition and raise its profits in the competitive segment. This dominant position
would not be of capital importance if information problems were irrelevant and the authorities could properly
regulate the market.  Moreover, in such case vertical integration could be consistent with efficiency gains
derived from scale economies and management. However, the analysis of the Chilean experience suggests that
these efficiency gains are eclipsed when information asymmetry is important and the regulator cannot enforce
regulation adequately. 
To a large extent conflict has stemmed from the perception that Enersis could engage in noncompetitive
behavior in at least three areas. First, Enersis’ distributor (Chilectra) could benefit its generator (Endesa) by
issuing preferential contracts, in particular to reduce risk at a higher cost for other producers. Second, since
two of the four directors of the dispatch center (CDEC) come from Endesa, and its affiliate Transelec is a
virtual monopoly in high-voltage transmission, the integrated firm could manipulate dispatch to its benefit.
Third, since Transelec is a subsidiary of Endesa, the latter can obtain inside information from it and receive
special treatment regarding tolls and other contract specifications. It is apparent that in all cases, the advantage
of the integrated firm is based on the information asymmetry derived from the fact that the regulator has limited
access to private contracts. To properly regulate the integrated firm, the authorities would require more
information than is currently available. In this sense, requiring trasnmission contracts to be submitted to the
CNE (as is mandatory in several other countries) could be a useful reform to the regulatory mechanism.
The Chilean case also shows that once property rights have been allocated to firms in the privatization process,
they become very difficult to modify. In turn, this implies that the monopoly will spend its resources trying to
avoid further changes to regulation or property rights (lobbying). A clear example is that when facing litigation
firms often hire a large group of experts in electricity and industrial organization, virtually cornering the
market. In addition, when regulation is not optimal, property rights can sometimes be used as legal entry
barriers, as is the case of water rights. All these problems (which could have been easily anticipated at the
moment of designing the privatization process), have caused much of the litigation that took place between
1990 and 1998.
A second group of disputes and conflicts are those arising from ambiguities in the regulatory framework. An
ambiguous regulatory framework makes contracts incomplete and promotes opportunistic behavior in the
market, which is exacerbated when institutions are weak or unable to enforce contracts. Chile’s experience
illustrates the perils of privatizing an industry characterized by natural monopoly segments and substantial
informational asymmetries without implementing a full regulatory body. The Chilean electricity sector was
divested in the absence of the operational statute envisioned by the privatization law to determine key aspects
of regulation, including transmission tolls and prorating of investment. Although the operational statute should
have been enacted in the early 1990s, it has not been implemented to date. The lack of definition and
ambiguities of important aspects of regulation have led to a large number of renegotiations and disputes (some
of which were legitimate business conflicts), but it has also allowed firms to behave opportunistically and
extract rents from consumers and other firms.
The third source of conflicts are those arising from the limitations of regulatory agencies in terms of human
capital, legal frameworks and financial resources. An endemic problem is the lack of a trained staff to deal with
their private sector counterparts. It affects, for instance, the relative power of the government at the moment
of renegotiating regulated tariffs. It also had a damaging effect in weakening the prosecutor’s position in the
vertical integration cases, where the latter lacked a consistent set of arguments to convince judges that
presumptions in cases of regulation can be as important as tangible evidence. In addition, lack of resources and
low wages have also created a fragile human capital pool for Chile’s public sector. Individuals obtain34
experience by working in the regulatory agency and then move on to better paid private sector employment in
the regulated industry, leaving less qualified and dynamic personnel in the public sector. In addition, this has
the perverse effect that regulators hoping to obtain employment in a regulated firm are reluctant to make
decisions that would negatively affect a potential employer, even when such decisions would improve overall
welfare.
On the other hand, disputes in the electricity sector are often of an extremely technical nature, requiring an
independent and well-trained Judiciary to resolve disputes at reasonable costs. Otherwise the possibility of
opportunistic behavior (as was apparent in the tariff setting cases) will cause productive and allocative
inefficiency. Chilean judges are not well versed in economics. Their formal education is restricted to the field
of law; training in economics is informal and limited. In addition, Chile’s legal apparatus is very inefficient not
only in terms of the speed at which cases are processed, but also because of its tendency to rely on “tangible”
proof of illegal activity. In cases of noncompetitive behavior, physical evidence is very difficult to obtain (in
cases of predatory behavior it is actually impossible to obtain). Inefficiency increases litigation costs.
When the Judiciary System is unable to provide quick and fair treatment to disputes, it is to the advantage of
both parties to use the services of an independent arbitrator. The main drawback of arbitration is the lack of
enforceable power of their decisions or penalties.  Arbitrators have played an important role in Chile, but their
inability to issue mandatory opinions limit their impact and have led the government to propose the creation
of arbitration commissions with punitive power.
Several of the lessons stemming from the regulation of the electricity sector have been learned and implemented
in the highway franchising program.  In particular, the institutional and regulatory design has been positively
influenced by the experience gathered in the electricity sector which share similar natural monopoly
characteristics. 
First, authorities have reacted quickly in response to perceived wrongdoing or regulatory weaknesses.  The
government has refused to change franchise conditions on the grounds that a bidder in a concession must accept
the risks of the concession and that an eventual renegotiation is costly and hampers its reputation. Second, the
government has been careful to avoid the creation of a very large and politically powerful holding. By imposing
restrictions on the number of franchises a firm can hold, the government signaled its comittment to setting up
a competitive industry and to limit the potential for political power of a large concessionaire. Third, the
government has made an attempt to overcome the limitations of the Judiciary  by designing and implementing
entities that can, in principle, deal more efficiently with contract renegotiation. Due to design complexities and
uncertainty, contracts in this area are likely to be incomplete and prone to disputes. Taking into account the
limitations of the Judiciary System when dealing with disputes in the electricity sector, the government created
specific entities to deal with contract disputes between highway concessionaires and the authorities. 35
References
Bitran E. and E. Saavedra. 1993. Algunas reflexiones en torno al rol regulador y empresarial del estado. In
Después de las privatizaciones: Hacia un estado regulador, ed. O. Muñoz, CIEPLAN.
Blanlot, V. 1993. La regulación del sector eléctrico: La experiencia chilena. In ed. O. Munoz, op. cit.
Díaz, C.A., A. Galetovic and R. Soto. 1999. Anatomy of an Electricity Crisis I and II. Mimeo, Graduate
Program in Economics ILADES / Georgetown University.
Morandé, F. and J.M. Sánchez. 1992. Incentivos y formas de discriminación en oferta de electricidad. Mimeo.
Graduate Program in Economics ILADES / Georgetown University.
Paredes, R. 1995. Jurisprudencia de las Comisiones Antimonopolios en Chile. Revista de Estudios Públicos,
58: 227-317.
Paredes, R., J. M. Sanchez, and A. Fernández. 1995. Privatización y regulación en Latinoamérica. Revista de
Análisis Económico, Vol. 10, 2.
Sáez, R. 1993. Las privatizaciones de empresas en Chile. In Después de las privatizaciones: Hacia un estado
regulador, ed. O. Munoz, op. cit.